The interagency and counterinsurgency warfare [Elektronisk resurs] stability, security, transition, and reconstruction roles / Joseph R. Cerami, Jay W. Boggs, editors.
Cerami, Joseph R.
Boggs, Jay W.
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
Texas A & M University. George Bush School of Government and Public Service.
- Publicerad: 2007
- Publicerad: [Carlisle Barracks, PA] : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007.
- Engelska xi, 605 p.
Läs hela texten
- Introduction -- I. Issues and challenges in support and stability operations -- 1. Challenges in support and stability operations: why each one is different -- 2. Presidential Decision Directive-56: a glass half full -- 3. A "Peace Corps with guns": can the military be a tool of development? -- Pt. II. Case studies and field experiences -- 4. The perils of planning: lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq -- 5. U.S. provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, 2003-2006: obstacles to interagency cooperation -- 6. The interagency process in reconstruction of post-World II Japan -- 7. An alternative view: Sri Lanka's experience with an enduring insurgency -- Pt. III. Learning, innovation, and new initiatives -- 8. The exquisite problem of victory: measuring success in unconventional operations -- 9. The failure of incrementalism: interagency coordination challenges and responses -- 10. Interagency reform: an idea whose time has come -- 11. Strategic communication: interagency rhetoric and consistent interpretation -- Pt. IV. Leadership, education, training, and development for interagency operations -- 12. Bridging the gap: integrating civilian-military capabilities in security and reconstruction operations -- 13. Training, education, and leader development for the national security interagency -- 14. Leadership education and training for the interagency -- 15. The influence of stability operations on the Army profession and public management -- 16. Counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: a bottom-up review -- 17. What is to be done?: aligning and integrating the interagency process in support and stability operations.
- For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.
- Counterinsurgency. (LCSH)
- Interagency coordination -- United States. (LCSH)
- Nation-building -- United States. (LCSH)
- United States -- Armed Forces -- Stability operations. (LCSH)
- JZ6300 (LCC)
Titeln finns på 1 bibliotek. Ange som favorit